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Abstract
It has been claimed that ‘virtuous structures’ can foster moral agency in organisations. We investigate this in the context 
of employee involvement in corporate philanthropy, an activity whose moral status has been disputed. Employing Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s account of moral agency, we analyse the results of eight focus groups with employees engaged in corporate 
philanthropy in an employee-owned retailer, the John Lewis Partnership. Within this organisational context, Employee–Part-
ners’ moral agency was evidenced in narrative accounts of their engagement in philanthropic activities and in their disputes 
about the moral status of corporate philanthropy.
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Introduction, Moral Agency and Corporate 
Philanthropy
Moral agency requires us both to act for moral reasons and 
to provide an account of why those reasons are moral. On 
Garvin’s (1948, p. 191) account:
It must be granted that the term “moral agent” is com-
monly used to mean an agent capable of, if not actually 
engaged in, moral reflection.
This research provides the first systematic empirical enquiry 
to examine a hitherto theoretically based dispute about moral 
agency. From a practical perspective, the moral commit-
ment of employees is an increasing concern (Valentine et al. 
2014). For instance, millennials believe that their opportu-
nity to be impactful towards moral issues are greater within 
organisations than anywhere else (Deloitte 2017). Research-
ers and pressure groups extol organisations to exercise moral 
agency and to develop virtue (Arjoon 2000; Sison and Fon-
trodona 2012; Blueprint for Better Business 2014). This 
enquiry sheds light on the conditions that might enable such 
agency to be exercised.
A number of scholars have claimed that structural 
changes could foster moral agency at work. Virtuous struc-
tures (Vriens et al. 2018), participatory governance (Bernac-
chio and Couch 2015), employee control over production 
(Breen 2012), employee involvement (Sinnicks 2016) and 
meaningful work (Moore 2017), have all been promoted 
on these grounds. Drawing together much of this litera-
ture, Vriens et al. (2018) argue that virtuous structures are 
characterised by three mutually supportive elements—they 
enable employees to deliberate and make decisions, they 
promote teleological purpose and they involve accountabili-
ties within managerial hierarchies. Such structures would not 
only enable the exercise of moral agency but may also help 
address cynicism, distrust and passivity amongst workers. 
Our enquiry required both an organisation that exhibits these 
three features and a specific activity that offers a context 
for moral agency (Vriens et al. 2018). These were provided 
by an employee-owned business, The John Lewis Partner-
ship through its central involvement of employees, known as 
partners, in its extensive corporate philanthropic activities. 
Corporate philanthropy is evidenced through for instance 
cash donations and in-kind time and as Saiia (2001, p. 58) 
asserts “when an organisation engages in philanthropy it is 
confronted with the task of allocating resources for activities 
not directly related to its immediate business objectives and 
thus must consider what is important to support”.
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The John Lewis Partnership is the largest employee-
owned business in the UK employing 83,000 Partners (John 
Lewis Partnership 2018a) operating two retail brands, John 
Lewis and Partners, an omni-channel retailer with 51 ‘high-
end’ high street department stores and Waitrose and Partners 
offering quality food, responsibly sourced with 349 shops. 
It was voted the Best UK Retailer in 2018 (Hosie 2018) for 
the fifth year running. In 2018, The John Lewis Partnership 
had gross sales of £11.6bn, profit before tax of £103.9 m and 
£74 m was distributed as Partner bonus (John Lewis Partner-
ship 2018a). In 2016/17, 3.1% of pre-tax profits (£11.5 mil-
lion of cash and in-kind support) were donated to charitable 
causes (John Lewis Partnership 2018b), historically ahead 
of other ‘responsible’ retailers. The company is owned by 
a trust on behalf of all its employees who have a say in the 
running of the business through the Partnership Council and 
Partnership Board, two of the three governing bodies of the 
Partnership alongside the Chairman. Through this unique 
constitutional settlement (Cox 2010), The Partnership has 
embedded employee decision-making, teleological purpose 
(centred on the partners) and managerial accountabilities.
A notable feature of the Partnership’s philanthropic activ-
ities and decision-making is that employees in stores select 
beneficiaries themselves. If the argument for a positive rela-
tionship between employee involvement in decision-making 
and moral agency is sound, then we would expect to find 
evidence of it at the John Lewis Partnership. It thus provided 
an appropriate context for our research question: How does 
employee participation in and deliberation about corporate 
philanthropy evidence moral agency?
Corporate Philanthropy has long occasioned dispute 
because whilst some regard philanthropy as epiphenomenal 
of moral agency (Grant et al. 2007; Grant and Hoffmann 
2011; Grant 2012; Sulck 2010) others express scepticism 
(Porter and Kramer 2002). In particular, the concept of stra-
tegic philanthropy, with clear business objectives, has met 
with sustained criticism (Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen 2009). 
Friedman (1970) argued from an economic perspective that 
philanthropy could only be justified, as a use of shareholder 
money, if it led to a direct benefit for the organisation. Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning, strategic philanthropy enables 
“the synergistic use of a firm’s resources to achieve both 
organisation and social benefits” (Thorne et al. 2003, p. 360) 
or more bluntly as criticised by Haley (1991) as a means to 
“influence corporate stakeholders and to advance managerial 
interests” (p. 486).
According to its critics (and see the debate in Godfrey 
2005), the self-regarding intent of strategic philanthropy pre-
cludes it as an example of moral agency regardless of any 
beneficent outcomes. This understanding of the orientation 
of corporate decision-making aligns with that of the most 
cited contemporary virtue theorist in the business ethics lit-
erature (Ferrero and Sison 2014), Alasdair MacIntyre. On 
MacIntyre’s Aristotelian account, moral agency is a potenti-
ality and virtue nothing other than its actualisation as ‘excel-
lence in human agency’ (Lutz 2012, p. 150). Our develop-
ment towards becoming such agents is highly dependent on 
the social structures we inhabit and the forms of practical 
rationality they entail (MacIntyre 1979, 1987, 1999b, 2000, 
2016). For MacIntyre, it is not the self-regarding orientation 
of corporate life but rather the modes of thought and action 
required of those who pursue such corporate aims at work, 
the common goods of family life at home and public goods 
in their thinking as citizens, that corrodes their moral agency 
by dis-integrating it. MacIntyre’s critique of such compart-
mentalisation drew from empirical enquiries undertaken in 
the late 1970s with power company executives (MacIntyre 
1979):
The framework of executive reasoning is socially 
defined so that certain limits are placed upon what 
questions may or may not be raised about it. These 
limitations take the form of a definition of responsibil-
ity. In his capacity of corporate executive, the manager 
not only has no need to, but must not take account of 
certain types of considerations which he might feel 
obliged to recognise were he acting as parent, as con-
sumer, as citizen (MacIntyre 1979, p. 126)
His compartmentalisation thesis is one example of Mac-
Intyre’s wider account of the intimacy of the relationship 
between social structures and moral agency. According to 
McMylor’s (1994) intellectual biography, his insistence that 
moral philosophy cannot be properly undertaken without 
an account of social practice distinguishes MacIntyre most 
clearly from his contemporaries. It is also one reason why 
business ethics researchers employing MacIntyre’s theses 
and arguments have so often undertaken empirical enquir-
ies (see Beadle (2017) for summary). This paper extends 
that project.
The contrast between MacIntyre’s pessimistic account of 
the prospects for moral agency in the contemporary work-
places and the optimistic account of other virtue-based 
accounts such as Vriens et al. (2018) could not be starker. 
Both pessimists and optimists however share the contention 
that agency and structure are interwoven such that enquir-
ies into agency must also be enquiries into the structures 
that enable or disable it. Operationalising an enquiry into 
moral agency, therefore, required both attentiveness to the 
particularities of structure and a robust analysis of agency.
In respect of the latter, we adopted MacIntyre’s (1999a) 
four dimensions for the attribution of moral agency for 
three reasons. First, it closely aligns with contemporary 
neo-Aristotelian accounts such as that of Alzola (2015). 
Second, much of the literature on moral agency at work 
(especially Bernacchio and Couch 2015; Breen 2012 and 
Moore 2017) has sought to counter MacIntyre’s pessimism 
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regarding its prospects in contemporary organisations (see 
especially MacIntyre 1999b). Third, MacIntyre’s widely 
cited work (Ferrero and Sison 2014) has been pivotal to 
the renaissance of virtue ethics in business (Beadle et al. 
2015). By purposively applying MacIntyre’s own schema, 
this enquiry provides the first empirical enquiry to examine 
a hitherto theoretical dispute between virtue theorists about 
the prospects for moral agency in organisations.
Eight partner focus groups were undertaken across two 
flagship John Lewis stores in Newcastle upon Tyne and 
Edinburgh (both UK). In total, 52 partners engaged in the 
focus groups, reflecting all levels of hierarchy within the 
stores. The transcribed data provided rich evidence of debate 
around their exercise of moral agency. This primary qualita-
tive data was supported by analysis of archival data through 
access to the company’s local and national journals.
The paper proceeds as follows. “Literature review: dis-
putes about the potential for moral agency in organisations” 
introduces the literature on moral agency in organisations 
and the claims made for virtuous structures. “Background 
and organisational context” outlines key features of the Part-
nership in their historical context. “Method” provides an 
overview of the research methods employed in this enquiry. 
“Findings and discussion” reports findings using MacIn-
tyre’s (1999a) schema to evidence moral agency. In “Con-
clusion” we summarise the contributions of this study for 
theory and empirical research in moral agency.
Literature Review: Disputes About 
the Potential for Moral Agency 
in Organisations
The literature on ‘virtuous structures’ presupposes a series 
of agreements as to the importance of organisational context 
for the development of employees’ moral agency (Vriens 
et al. 2018; Sinnicks 2014). In virtue-based accounts, habitu-
ation and repetition are critical to the development of the 
virtues and this includes agents’ own conceptualisation of 
the moral dimensions of action. A context in which agents 
are mutually accountable, deliberate together about and 
towards worthwhile goals and act on the results are believed 
to enhance capacities for moral reasoning (MacIntyre 2000; 
Weaver 2006; McPherson 2013; Alzola 2015). On MacIn-
tyre’s account, organisations and wider social structures are 
thereby understood as either generative of, or threatening 
to such moral communities but never neutral (MacIntyre 
1999b; Brecher 2015). Shoemaker (2007, pp. 70–71) use-
fully summarises the communal presupposition of such 
accounts of moral agency:
our practices in voicing the praise and blame expres-
sive of holding someone morally responsible, in the 
paradigm case, consist of an interplay between at least 
two agents, one who addresses a moral demand to the 
other via the praise and blame and the other who osten-
sibly hears, understands and either accepts or rejects 
the demand, and such an exchange is possible only for 
those who have the capacity to enter into a certain kind 
of relationship with one another. Call those who share 
this capacity, then, moral agents, and call the collec-
tion of agents a moral community.
Virtue based accounts of moral agency are non-reductive 
(Alzola 2015) and multi-dimensional (Sundararajan 2005; 
Martin 2007; Miller 2008; Nussbaum 2008; Banicki 2014; 
Bright et al. 2014; Beadle et al. 2015). MacIntyre (1990) 
provides a precisive account of the attribution of moral 
agency, consistent with other virtue ethicists (Alzola 2015) 
and potentially directive for empirical enquiries in particu-
lar contexts. This argues that moral agency may only be 
ascribed when four conditions are met. First, any claim must 
be able to identify counterfactuals (through which actions 
may be regarded as unjust, intemperate and so on). If we 
are to assert an agent’s virtue, we must be able to recognise 
the types of circumstances which would negate that attribu-
tion. Without an awareness of such conditions, our claims 
are spurious. Second, we must know enough to be able to 
establish the intent of the action so that we can distinguish 
actions taken in pursuit of genuine goods from others. This 
requires ongoing evidence of correspondence between action 
and intent. It is when we have both witnessed an act and 
have listened to the agent’s reasoning that we are able to 
attribute behaviour to moral commitment. Once again, a 
context for mutual accountability and shared deliberation is 
a pre-condition for the quality of relationship that such judg-
ment requires. Third, the moral agent experiences pleasure 
and pain (pathos) in proportion to their objects. It is only if 
we can distinguish, for example, relief at the avoidance of 
another’s harm from a feigned response, that we can make 
such attributions. This requires us to look for indications 
of emotional response beyond language. Finally, we need 
a sufficient range of actions, objects and occasions through 
which to establish integrity and constancy. Although a single 
instance of infidelity, evasion or theft may convince us that 
an agent lacks moral agency, no single occasion provides 
grounds for attributing moral agency. It is only when all 
four conditions are met—counterfactuals, intent, pathos and 
range of occasions, that moral agency may be attributed. 
(MacIntyre 1999a; Alzola 2015).
Although it should be clear from the foregoing that stable 
social relationships, marked by mutual accountabilities and 
shared deliberation, are pre-requisite to the attribution of 
moral agency, the prospects of the latter within organisations 
has been a matter of dispute between virtue ethicists. Mac-
Intyre (2007 [1981], pp. 27–30) argues that workers’ moral 
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agency is critically undermined by decision-making struc-
tures of the workplace. On his account, moral agency could 
only be fostered where workers exercise deliberative and 
participative control over production, becoming account-
able to one another in light of the standards of the relevant 
practice (MacIntyre 2016, pp. 130, 170–173; Knight 2015; 
Beadle and Knight 2012; Breen 2012). As early as 1967, 
MacIntyre argued that capitalism critically undermines 
moral agency and adopted Hegel’s concept of ‘the spiritual 
zoo’ to identify a social order in which:
the agent does his duty in his immediate sphere with-
out asking about the context within which he acts or 
the wider effects of his actions. He accepts deliber-
ately a limited vision of both his actions and of his 
responsibilities. His is not to reason why. (He lives in 
the spiritual zoo; the animals are all in separate cages) 
(MacIntyre 1967, p. 207).
Others, though sympathetic to MacIntyre’s ethics, argue that 
varieties of capitalism are differentially conducive to the 
development of virtues (Keat 2008; Beabout 2012). Bernac-
chio and Couch (2015, p. 140) argue that employee involve-
ment in governance may provide “experiences that call for 
the exercise of virtue” even when work routines are Tay-
lorised. Sinnicks (2014, 2016) and Moore (2017) argue for 
governance and leadership processes that fall short of work-
ers’ control. Bernacchio (2018) argues that virtuous action 
in organisations is more likely in the context of naturally 
occurring networks of giving and receiving that develop 
through organisational processes. Consistent with such rea-
soning, Vriens et al. (2018, p. 672) integrate research from a 
variety of disciplines to argue that organisational structures 
within appropriate teleological, deliberative and social con-
texts “increase the possibility of exercising and developing 
moral character” (emphasis retained).
Background and Organisational Context
The John Lewis Partnership on which this research is based 
has been praised for its constitutional settlement, embedding 
accountability and employee involvement in decision-mak-
ing (Flanders et al. 1968; Erdal 2011; Paranque and Willmott 
2014; Salaman and Storey 2016). This settlement resonates 
with its historical roots, and importantly provides a context 
in which to understand its philanthropic philosophy and tra-
dition. Spedan Lewis, (son of the eponymous John), founded 
the Partnership through transferring ownership of the retailer 
(John Lewis) to its employees. According to Cox (2010), he 
was likely to have been influenced by the 1891 Encyclical 
‘Rerum Novarum’, which argued for a rebalancing of the 
returns to capital and labour1. The transfer to employee own-
ership began once Spedan took control of the firm in 1929 
(Cox 2010). Spedan’s reasoning had developed in 1910, cen-
tred upon his discovery that the cumulative earnings of the 
workforce (then 300 employees) was at the same level as that 
earned by his family as owners. Such a position was justi-
fied by his father’s adherence to a form of Victorian rational 
egoism. By contrast Cox quotes Spedan Lewis as writing:
In fact, as a whole the staff were getting just a bare 
living, with very little margin beyond absolute neces-
sities and correspondingly little chance to get much 
fun out of life … In all such ways the management 
could hardly have been more ruthlessly close-fisted. 
Obviously such a state of affairs could not have existed 
unless the general conditions at the time had been 
more or less similar. To me all this seemed shocking 
(Cox 2010, p. 32).
Over the subsequent decades, the Partnership transferred 
ownership to a Trust holding shares on behalf of employ-
ees; profit sharing and pensions were introduced alongside 
an elaborate constitution requiring managers at all levels to 
be accountable to employees through a variety of democratic 
and communications mechanisms (Salaman and Storey 
2016). The constitutional model for a partnership in which—
to use Spedan’s own phrase; ‘Knowledge, Gain and Power’ 
(Cox 2010, p. 53) were shared, has changed little from its 
original design.
Spedan’s influence was not limited to the transfer of own-
ership to employees and the embedding of accountability. 
He was also committed to philanthropic activities benefit-
ting employees and others but insisted that such ‘random 
acts of kindness’ must be undertaken ‘quietly’ (Cox 2010, p. 
152). His acts of kindness were legion and the Partnership’s 
accounts manifest this intent at the corporate level with 
donations reported since 1939 (Cox 2010, p. 112). The Part-
nership has subsequently maintained both its philanthropic 
tradition and its reticence about publicising this work. A 
notable element of its philanthropic work involves volunteer-
ing in which partners are supported to give time to work on 
philanthropic activities (Grant 2012). Since 2000, the Part-
nership’s Golden Jubilee Trust has sponsored employees to 
undertake voluntary work for up to six months (whilst being 
paid by the Partnership); over 330,000 hours were donated 
to 800 charities in the first 17 years of the scheme (John 
Lewis Partnership 2018a, b). Partners are willing to take up 
1 On the 50th anniversary of the Partnership, 1979 a commissioned 
sculpture was unveiled at their flagship London store, entitled ‘Capi-
tal and Labour’ (Cox 2010, p. 197)
Corporate Philanthropy as a Context for Moral Agency, a MacIntyrean Enquiry 
1 3
such opportunities, consistent with its directors’ sentiments 
regarding the Partnership’s employment selection criteria:
Frankly, we don’t want the kind of people who are only 
going to join us if the pay rate is so huge. We don’t just 
want good people, we want good people, those who 
really do share our values (Cox 2010, p. 274, emphasis 
retained).
Developing this reasoning and beyond its commitment to 
philanthropy and the involvement of partners, other actions 
and awards resonate with a virtuous organisational context. 
For instance, The Partnership average hourly rate of base pay 
for non-management Partners is £9.16, which is 17%, above 
the National Living Wage (2019). The Partnership operates 
an above market reward model where benefits are higher 
than competitors (British Retail Consortium, 2019) includ-
ing pensions, long leave and discount on goods and services. 
An indicator of its regard as an employer is highlighted by 
the Indeed.co.uk award as the Top Retailer to work for in 
2018 and evidence on that recruitment forum in which one 
employee (amongst many) specifically remarks, “John Lewis 
is a great place to work. Well managed and run and staff 
treated well. You are a Partner in the business, therefore it 
is your business” (Indeed 2019).
In respect of participation in ownership and decision-
making alongside the inheritance of local philanthropic 
traditions, the Partnership appeared to be an ideal site for 
an investigation of moral agency. If the arguments of Ber-
nacchio and Couch (2015), Sinnicks (2014), Vriens et al. 
(2018) and Moore (2017) about the relationship between 
moral agency and organisational practices were sound, then 
we could expect the Partnership to evidence moral agency. 
How would this be investigated?
Method
MacIntyre’s (1999a) four-fold schema of counterfactuals, 
knowledge of intent, pathos and learning across a range of 
contexts, was employed as a set of evaluative criteria that 
would enable us to discern moral agency. To explore inten-
tions, emotions and evidence required a phenomenological 
method (Reynolds 2013), that could enable morally agen-
tic thinking and action to be identified through analysis of 
narrative exchanges about the Partnership’s corporate phi-
lanthropy (see also Alzola 2015) consistent with Garvin’s 
(1948) moral reflection.
To achieve the required depth and multi-dimensionality, 
a focus group approach was adopted as the primary data 
collection instrument. All participants were guaranteed 
anonymity to encourage them to speak freely. As part of 
the research process, and to take forward the focus groups, 
organisational and individual ethical consent were obtained. 
This resulted from direct discussions between the research 
team and the organisation and subsequently with partners 
in the focus groups.
MacDougall and Fudge (2001) argue that a focus group is 
a singular data collection method and not an accumulation of 
interviews (see also Rothwell et al. 2016). The structure and 
content may vary considerably from one focus group to the 
next because of the unique dynamics of group interaction. 
Similarly, Asbury (1995), Murphy et al. (1992) and Morgan 
and Spanish (1984) claim that group interaction can yield 
richer information than individual interviews with the same 
participants. Further, Cowton and Downs (2015) argue that 
focus groups have potential for engaging participant debate 
specifically with regard to research in business ethics.
Whilst participants’ behaviour may change with data col-
lection methods (Desmond et al. 1995) and the potential 
of group and power dynamics leading to false consensus 
(Sim 1998) is a potential constraint; participant selection, 
planning and the researcher’s skill set can be used to obvi-
ate these dynamics. Gibbs (1997) posits that organising 
focus group interviews usually requires more planning than 
other types of interviewing and Barbour (2005) suggests 
time spent developing and piloting a topic guide should pay 
dividends in terms of its capacity to encourage discussion. 
This advice was heeded through the employment of a pilot 
in this enquiry.
Broom (2005), Mellon (1990) and Fern (1982) advise 
that the researcher should introduce themselves, taking up to 
15 minutes to engage in a ‘warm-up’ conversation to gener-
ate rapport, establish a comfortable environment and ensure 
that the participants fully understand the project. The inten-
tion is to encourage the respondents to talk freely and to be 
honest. Kitzinger (1995) claims that the researcher should 
consider how he/she is dressed as formal clothes can create 
a barrier that may impede the interaction between researcher 
and participants. A number of observation visits were made 
to the Partnership’s stores at various times and days to ena-
ble the first-named author to select appropriate dress for the 
conduct of the focus groups. Following Dearnley’s (2005) 
advice on venue, familiar meeting rooms were chosen and 
refreshments made available.
Focus group discussions were framed by a set of semi-
structured questions informed by relevant literature (Kitz-
inger 1996a, b; Race et  al. 1994; Hannabuss 1996 and 
“Appendix1”). We conducted small-scale pilot studies using 
both interview and focus group methods. The results of these 
studies confirmed the advantages of focus groups for gen-
erating richer narratives and surfacing both agreement and 
dispute (Hannabuss 1996; Nicholson 2015). Participants 
concurred with those reported by Bristol and Fern (1996) 
in finding the experience more stimulating than participat-
ing in either self-administered open-ended surveys or struc-
tured group interviews with less spontaneous interaction. 
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The focus group method was able to surface debates between 
partners who expressed different positions.
There is little guidance in the literature as to the number 
of focus groups appropriate to different types of question 
and population, Millward (1995) suggests saturation is likely 
after ten; Krueger (1994) suggests that the minimum may be 
three and the maximum twelve whilst Nyamathi and Shuler 
(1990) argue for no more than four. To gauge the extent to 
which participants’ understanding was shared between those 
participating in Corporate Philanthropy across sites, eight 
focus groups were undertaken across two department stores: 
five in Newcastle upon Tyne and three in Edinburgh. In total, 
52 partners took part in the focus groups following an open 
invitation to store employees. To gauge patterns at different 
hierarchical levels, all but one of the focus groups comprised 
partners at discrete levels (partner, section manager partner 
and departmental manager partner).
Recordings yielded 67,466 usable words following tran-
scription (some words were excluded due to interruptions, 
more than one participant speaking at the same time, accents 
rendering words unintelligible and the deletion of proper 
names). All participants were offered the relevant tran-
scribed focus group discussion and were free to redact any 
statements if they so wished. Our analysis was a multi-stage 
“iterative process in which ideas were used to make sense of 
data” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p. 158). A series of 
‘interpretive repertoires’ (Potter and Wetherell 1987) reflect 
recurrent themes. To preserve participant anonymity, names 
been changed.
Transcripts were thematically analysed for the presence 
of the four elements required for the attribution of moral 
agency posited by MacIntyre (1999a): counterfactuals, 
knowledge of intent, pathos and learning across contexts. 
We moved beyond an impressionistic view of the data by 
specifically noting each occurrence of the four ascriptions. 
In doing so, we have endeavoured to show how our inter-
pretations are “embedded in empirical material” (Reinecke 
et al. 2016, p. xvii).
It is important to acknowledge that the results of small-
scale phenomenological enquiries cannot meet the condi-
tions that positivists would require to assert the validity, 
representativeness or generalisability of findings. Our study 
deliberately sought to engage a purposive sample of partners 
involved in corporate philanthropy; participants were self-
selecting and thus may exclude those who were unavailable 
or preferred not to discuss their involvement. None of this 
however is material to the method’s appropriateness to the 
central research question, because to elicit whether employee 
engagement in corporate philanthropy could occasion moral 
agency, the self-selection of participants was advantageous.
Findings and Discussion
To explore how employee deliberation about corporate 
philanthropy provides evidence for the attribution of moral 
agency, we first sought to understand employee involvement 
in philanthropic activities and related decision-making. 
Unexpectedly, this initial area of enquiry met with animated 
responses. Recent public relations’ initiatives to involve cus-
tomers in determining the recipients of philanthropic dona-
tions were roundly criticised by participants across all of the 
focus groups. They were typified by this response:
As we’ve already said we have our four charities we 
can choose from. If customers get involved are they 
going to say ‘well actually no we want that this’ and 
stuff like that so I think because it’s a partner and it’s 
a partner giving their time then I think it should just 
be coming from us rather than involving customers 
(Lizzy).
Customer involvement was viewed as both a breach of 
the Partnership’s established democratic processes and 
as an injustice towards those who would be conducting 
philanthropic work. Partners valued their involvement 
in decision-making through both nominating and deci-
sion–making rights about the philanthropic causes to be 
supported. To further understand this from a partners’ per-
spective, participants were asked about their involvement 
in the nomination of projects. This is facilitated by the 
employment of a full-time community liaison co-ordinator 
(CLC) in each store to garner partner opinion. The CLC 
manages the process of selecting beneficiaries, creating 
a short-list circulated to partners before an open meeting 
and partner vote.
Such an explicit employee interface is in stark contrast 
to commonly centralised decision-making about corpo-
rate philanthropy by a member of the senior management 
group or within marketing or human relations departments 
(Brammer and Millington 2004). One-off support for par-
ticular events and causes is also routed through the CLC 
and results of charitable campaigns are reported through 
the branch newspaper, The Chronicle.
Beyond their decision-making input, evidence of 
partners’ involvement in philanthropic activities was 
extensive. Volunteering projects recalled by participants 
included removing Japanese knotweed from bird habi-
tats, a school cooking project, a fashion show for a school 
for children with special needs, the creation of a scented 
garden for the blind, donations of display stock to local 
charities, fund-raising events and painting a care home 
and a flat for a newly released prisoner. At the same time, 
particular stores positively sought opportunities to enable 
their space to be used by local charities in addition to the 
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offer of a dedicated ‘community’ room for local groups 
to use at no cost. Events included the sale of children’s 
hand-made Christmas cards and a choir of military wives 
and girlfriends raising funds for wounded troops. Perhaps 
most surprisingly one participant reminded colleagues that 
employees had helped clean up after a competitor’s depart-
ment store experienced a flood. Other activities employed 
participants’ core competencies. These included assisting 
a local hospital shop and a homeless charity shop with 
merchandising, training a chef working in a soup kitchen 
for the homeless and teaching charity shop workers about 
window-display. One participant, Stuart, recalled specific 
training in customer relations:
One of our managers on the shop floor has been 
involved with [name of charity – ed.] as well as kind 
of speaking to all their volunteers about what our atti-
tude is to customers, and how they then take that to 
their customers.
Whilst, such types of philanthropy might well be under-
taken by any commercial organisation, this initial evidence 
suggests a strong social contracting (Slack et al. 2015) of 
the partners with philanthropic acts and the underpinning 
decision-making processes. The focus group method addi-
tionally encouraged participants to engage in the kind of 
substantive moral deliberation (Garvin 1948) that develops 
moral agency (MacIntyre 2000).
One debate recurred across all eight focus groups; this 
concerned the intent condition and specifically whether the 
Partnership should publicise philanthropic activity. Employee 
support for the visibility of corporate philanthropy (Cowton 
1987; Robertson and Nicholson 1996; St Clair and Tschirhart 
2002) and scepticism towards its intent (Porter and Kramer 
2002; Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen 2009) have both been 
reported in the literature. This research goes beyond previ-
ous studies in reporting animated moral argument of the kind 
noted by Shoemaker (2007), as indicative of moral commu-
nity. Three distinct positions about the appropriateness of 
corporate self-regarding intent recurred across focus groups.
A first position was taken by those who argued that the 
Partnership should promote its philanthropic activity in 
support of, even if not animated by, the reputational advan-
tages this brings. Support for such visibility involved three 
related themes, arguments from justice, arguments about 
commercial consequences and arguments about potential 
beneficiaries. The first theme was the perceived injustice 
that the Partnership experiences in failing to be recog-
nised for good work. The second theme highlighted cus-
tomers’ enhanced expectations of businesses’ philanthropy 
and argued that the increasing visibility of competitors’ 
philanthropic activities damaged the Partnership’s reputa-
tion relative to competitors. The third theme argued that 
potential beneficiaries may not approach the Partnership 
for support as they may be unaware of the extent of the 
Partnership’s giving. All of these themes were predicated 
on the importance of reputation. Whilst none argued a 
rational egoist position that philanthropy should be stra-
tegic, many argued that impact on the organisation should 
operate as a legitimate consideration.
For instance, Hannah, drawing on reputation, with par-
ticular regard to customers, argued as follows:
I think we could do more in terms of shouting about 
what we do and getting more back from press and 
PR….I think customers and other agencies and 
organisations would actually benefit from knowing 
about what we do…. I think it’s really important to 
help us upkeep our trading policy and it helps cus-
tomers believe in us more that we are a trader of 
distinction…you know above and beyond the norm. 
I’m passionate about it and I’m pleased that we do it.
The strands of justice and reputational standing were com-
monly voiced in this group. For instance, Brenda high-
lighted the injustice of this lack of recognition:
I think that when you see other companies; I shan’t 
mention names but you know quite near companies 
to us that do have big signs up, it does make us think 
well our customers will think -ooh they’re good but 
John Lewis aren’t.
These arguments are not so much advocating traditional 
strategic philanthropy as legitimising a defensive response 
to the strategic philanthropy of others. But even this step 
in the direction of visibility was too much for others. A 
second position that moral agency is betrayed by such rep-
utational intent (Mescon and Tilson 1987). They pursued 
a single argument—namely philanthropy should be exclu-
sively other-regarding. Once any form of self-regarding 
consideration was entered into, this undermined the intent 
proper to philanthropy and the founding principle of ‘giv-
ing quietly’. For partners arguing this position, such as 
Betty (see also Table 2); the only question at issue was 
whether reputational effects should be the subject of any 
consideration at all. On this account, philanthropy pre-
cluded the legitimacy of any strategic interest; Chloe suc-
cinctly argued: “I think that’d be the wrong reason for 
doing it as well.”
The following exchange from one of the focus groups 
highlights this tension between partners and their respective 
positioning regarding the external visibility of philanthropy:
Susan: “I sometimes think that we should shout 
about it because when you go into the likes of [name 
of retailer] it’s really in your face erm and I also I 
kind of think why aren’t we doing that you know do 
people really know what we do and I don’t think;”
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Arthur: “But then you’ve got to question why - why do 
they- are [name of retailer] doing it for the right reason 
or are they just doing it for something to shout about 
there’s an awful lot of businesses do it because they 
want to look good from a CSR point of view;”
Susan: “Yeah there’s plenty recognition;”
Arthur: “When actually we do it because we want to do 
it and actually if no-one else knows it doesn’t matter.”
Arthur (and others who argued similarly) held to a strict dis-
tinction between self-regarding and other-regarding action. 
Moral agents must act ‘for the right reasons’ and this con-
dition is critically undermined by those who ‘boast’ about 
philanthropic achievement. On this account, strategic philan-
thropy is oxymoronic as only other-regarding action counts 
as philanthropic. By contrast, those who supported publicis-
ing the Partnership’s philanthropic work did not regard the 
object of intention as the only arbiter of moral agency. They 
held that extending the range of beneficiaries and securing 
just recognition were proper objects of moral action.
A third position comprised those who believed there to 
be a happy co-incidence. They held that commercial inter-
ests were legitimate and served by the company’s traditional 
reticence. Such an argument had, incidentally, informed the 
company’s refusal to advertise at all from the 1920s to the 
1990s (Cox 2010). Their arguments against enhancing the 
visibility of the Partnership’s philanthropy were subtle in 
acknowledging the reputational benefits and commercial 
advantages that arose. These included Hazel:
But there’s no getting away from that commercial ben-
efit either and that’s what I was suggesting earlier on 
getting involved with the younger generation we’re 
introducing ourselves as a company because we don’t 
advertise as much. Everyone loves the Christmas ads 
but they’re new, whereas being involved in the commu-
nity is something we’ve being doing for a very long time
Jenny, though committed to philanthropic work for ‘the 
right reasons’, also sought a balance with the reputational 
arguments:
Especially because we don’t advertise it so much it does 
kind of make you feel that you’re doing it for the giving 
reasons not because ‘look at us’ and I think sometimes 
to be fair I think people think that we don’t advertise it 
quite enough because people don’t realise necessarily 
that we do it. So it’s kind of like getting that right bal-
ance we’re not doing it for the advertising but I think 
we do need to let people know that we do do something.
Jenny’s discussion acknowledges the views of both those 
committed to acting ‘for the giving reasons’ and those who 
think that visibility should be enhanced before concluding 
with her own preference for the ‘right balance’. She thereby 
incorporates both affective (‘make you feel’) and inten-
tional (‘not doing it for the advertising’) dimensions and 
inasmuch as her moral reasoning presupposes community 
(‘us’ an ‘we’ recur six times in this short extract), Jenny 
illustrates the type of reasoning within a moral community 
that aligns closely with Shoemaker’s (2007) understand-
ing of moral agency. Tensions between a notion of moral 
agency focused on philanthropic action and a commercial 
environment which formed the setting for organisational 
action was manifested in each of these three positions. Part-
ners contested accounts that provided evaluations of them-
selves, their organisation and others as acting towards or 
departing from what they regarded as moral purposes. As 
we have seen, contestation, in the form of the establishment 
of counterfactuals, is essential to MacIntyre’s account of 
moral agency; for we cannot claim moral agency without an 
ability to discriminate the ‘moral’. The animation of debates 
between those who held diverging opinions of the legiti-
macy of self and other-regarding action in a context of strong 
organisational identification itself provides evidence for the 
fostering of moral agency and the opportunities provided for 
its exercise within the Partnership.
Regardless of their disagreements, participants shared an 
overwhelmingly positive appraisal of the company’s philan-
thropic work, one that elicited pride and provoked commit-
ment. Participants displayed a high degree of identification 
between partners, the Partnership and with the local com-
munity. Such identifications provided both presuppositions 
for the debate and rhetorical resources for argumentation. 
Whilst corporate moral agency remains contested in the lit-
erature (Moore 2015), participants in this enquiry regarded 
the Partnership as a corporate actor with reasons, interests, 
actions and a history (Cox 2010). From this, philanthropic 
activities could be understood as part of an ongoing narra-
tive identity. For example, Chloe drew on the purposes with 
which the Partnership’s founder, Spedan Lewis (1885–1963) 
had attempted to imbue the co-owned company:
And you’re major major employer of course you’re a 
major retailer you’re a major business in the UK you’ve 
got a responsibility actually as part of the wider society 
…and there’s little bit of that just sits well with what 
our founder was trying to do really. It just feels right.
Without the strong sense of organisational identity (Albert 
and Whetten 1984; Dutton and Dukerich 1991), the debate 
as to whether philanthropy should be visible would not have 
engaged partners as it did. The situated nature of the moral 
arguments brought to bear here derive from inherited tradi-
tions. In particular, the opposition to ‘shouting about’ their 
achievements resonates strongly with the commitment to 
other-regarding moral agency that characterised the phil-
anthropic work of the Partnership’s founder, Spedan Lewis. 
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According to the testimony of Spedan Lewis’s Personal 
Assistant from the 1930s:
Spedan dispensed such kindness quietly; many [letters 
from beneficiaries – ed.] turn up unexpectedly and it 
led to a Partnership tradition of random acts of kind-
ness dispensed quietly (Cox 2010, p. 152).
Indeed, in maintaining such an identity through quiet giv-
ing, Bill suggested that it was the very absence of external 
visibility that he appreciated about the philanthropic work 
of the Partnership nationally and in his branch:
I think the thing I like as well is that we’re not slap bang 
on papers we keep it quite quiet, we keep it personal.
The auditory metaphor was far more commonly invoked than 
other semiotic channels; whilst the claim that this evidences 
the cultural resonance of Spedan Lewis’s ‘quiet’ dispens-
ing of kindness would be difficult to press, the frequency 
of references to tradition is undeniable. This mediation of 
relationships between individual and organisational agency 
in terms of Partnership tradition presupposes a strong organ-
isational identity, one that provides rhetorical resources for 
argumentation.
By contrast, the motives of competitors’ ‘marketised phi-
lanthropy’ (Nickel and Eikenberry 2009) were often derided. 
The contrast with the other-regarding motives of the Partner-
ship caused argumentative obstacles for those who would 
support the promotion of its philanthropic activity whilst 
maintaining loyalty to received tradition. At their most 
elegiac, participants lauded partners’ conformity to other-
regarding norms inimical to their own economic interests. 
For instance, Susan contended that:
we’ll hear things that happen throughout the year and 
partners’ first reaction will be ‘well if we didn’t do that 
would that eat into our bonus?’ you never hear that 
about charities so you never hear partners going ‘well 
if we didn’t give that what would that mean to us?’ and 
I think that’s great.
Teresa echoed this observation in another group:
Profit is our bonus … so really we are giving from 
ourselves as well, not just the company, and we’re all 
happy to do that.
Susan’s ‘never’ and Teresa’s ‘all’ represent the strongest pos-
sible claims for a “local moral landscape” (Harré et al. 2009, 
p. 9) in which corporate philanthropy is unquestioned. If 
these generalizations are to be believed (and neither of these 
examples were contradicted by other participants), then we 
have grounds to claim that partners identify with the wider 
social ambitions that animated the creation of the Partner-
ship. Partners’ praised their own and others’ moral agency 
and associated it with a notion of historically informed 
organisational identity.
On the virtue-based account, moral agency requires 
practical deliberation. The level of dispute between partici-
pants, and their own reflections, evidenced in these debates 
is itself emblematic of agency that would be consistent with 
Garvin’s (1948) account. But does this evidence exhibit all 
four dimensions of moral agency (MacIntyre 1999a; Alzola 
2015), the framing on which this research is based? To 
answer this question requires us to isolate elements of text. 
This is necessary to illustrate the conditions that MacIntyre 
(2000) and Alzola (2015) require before assertions of moral 
agency be made. The analysis that follows can neither cap-
ture the animation of the conversations, nor estimate the 
moral agency exhibited by particular participants. Instead, 
it enables us to exemplify dimensions of moral agency and 
to provide the analytical rigour required to evaluate whether 
employee engagement in corporate philanthropy has occa-
sioned moral agency at the John Lewis Partnership. In order 
to demonstrate the regularity of illustrations, different speak-
ers are quoted in each extracted text.
First, counterfactuals of different kinds were deployed to 
contrast positive accounts of the Partnership against those 
of other businesses (both competitors and those in other 
sectors). The three repertoires, from 31 identified through 
thematic analysis, illustrate the range of counterfactual con-
ditions identified by partners. Each example is taken from 
different participants in different focus groups (Table 1).
In each of these cases, participants established coun-
terfactual conditions through which to test propositions 
about moral agency. Competitors fail to meet counterfac-
tual conditions around temporality (‘We’ve always done it’, 
‘doing it on a regular basis’), embeddedness (‘it’s cultural 
you know’) and financial advantage (‘for the tax reasons’). 
The discriminator here is not that tests were made but rather 
conditions established and connected to factual claims. In 
the first case, Walter argues that the publicity generated and 
the consequent reputational advantage by another retailer 
demonstrates that in such instances agency was not directed 
towards good purposes with the philanthropic act itself at its 
heart. In the second example, Cal argues for constancy as a 
counterfactual condition and in the third case, Ali argues that 
tax advantages provide a motive whose absence may alleg-
edly change competitor behaviour; once again implying that 
it is the act itself as the legitimate purpose. In each case the 
counterfactual condition is such as to undermine the claim to 
philanthropic intent and it is this that provides the criterion 
by which other organisations were judged by participants. 
Whilst not all participants were critical of self-interest or 
used counterfactual conditions to test this; those who pro-
vided credible counterfactual conditions against which to 
judge other companies clearly did.
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The second of MacIntyre’s (1999a) dimensions of moral 
agency is the intent condition. The repertoires in Table 2, 
from 65 identified in thematic analysis, illustrate the propo-
sition that moral agency is to be distinguished by the phil-
anthropic intent of the kind tested by the counterfactuals 
recorded above. Again, the three participant examples are 
drawn from different focus groups.
The intent condition is exemplified in notions about the 
depth of commitment (‘actually want to do it’), voluntariness 
(‘not the company pushing you’) and through informing the 
types of counterfactuals (‘we’re so secretive’) that we have 
seen fellow participants invoke when evaluating the phil-
anthropic activities of the Partnership and its rivals. They 
highlight disputes about intent that were evident across the 
focus groups and that informed conflicting judgments about 
the merits of visibility and reputation enhancement. The 
selected repertoires in Table 2 hint at the potential tension 
between the quiet discharge of giving compared to external 
reputational benefits alongside some insight into those par-
ticipants who held most firmly to the view that self-regard-
ing intent undermined claims on behalf of both the Partner-
ship and the individual to acting for ‘the right reasons.’ This 
position starkly contrasts with strategic philanthropy whose 
purpose in undertaking philanthropic activity to bestow 
reputational benefits is fundamentally self-regarding (Haley 
1991; Brammer and Millington 2005; Brammer et al. 2006).
The third dimension of moral agency is the articulation 
of appropriate feelings (pathos), expressed in the virtue lit-
erature as feeling pleasure and pain about the right things, 
to the right extent, in the right way; that is by some measure 
of proportionality (Gagliardi 1999). The three repertoires in 
Table 3, from 73 in the thematic analysis, are again those of 
different speakers in different focus groups (Table 3).
In each of these cases, participants’ stories elicited affec-
tive responses (‘lovely feeling’, ‘tearful’, ‘attached’, ‘bril-
liant feeling’, ‘proud’, ‘tears were in your eyes’), including 
17 occasions in which participants were visibly weeping. 
These exemplify emotional responses to both the beneficial 
impact of their agency and the attachment to beneficiaries. It 
is not only that goods have been created and distributed but 
that the beneficiaries are understood as properly deserving; 
on occasion this estimate has involved a transformation in 
regard occasioned by the activity itself. The effect of pro-
social giving in the context of contact with beneficiaries (e.g. 
Grant et al. 2007; Grant and Hoffman 2011; Grant 2012) 
hence receives further support in this research.
The fourth dimension of moral agency is the range and 
consistency of examples required for moral agency to be 
attributed. The three examples in Table 4, from 91 identi-
fied in the thematic analysis, are also drawn from different 
participants and focus groups and indicate a range and a 
consistency of philanthropic activity which enabled par-
ticipants to attribute moral agency to particular colleagues, 
organisational units and to the Partnership.
Participants exchanged examples from across a wide 
range of activities and schemes (‘catering department’, ‘part-
ners’ time’, ‘reading programme’), some involving individu-
als choosing from a range of options for volunteering, others 
involved with colleagues supporting particular causes and 
others involving partners nominating causes to be supported.
This research, drawing on participant voices in the focus 
groups, surfaces numerous examples of employee engage-
ment in both decision-making about and voluntary activity in 
support of the Partnership’s philanthropic work. Participants 
associated these practices with an understanding of moral 
agency consistent with the neo-Aristotelian conception.
Table 2  Examples of intent condition
Rose The other thing is actually that er when you are actually out there you actually want to do it, not the company pushing you out there 
and telling you to do it, it is actually the want to do it
Betty The Partnership give[s] maybe twice as much as other [corporations] do but we don’t talk about it—I mean surely for me the point is 
that we know we’re doing it and people that need the help get it—the other stuff is irrelevant to me
Hamish But if we’re so secretive about er our presence in terms of giving—how do we actually reach more people if we’re just going to put 
tiny things in the [internal] paper?
Table 1  Examples of counterfactual conditions
Walter Well you’re right, we don’t trade on it the way say XXX [another major retailer] … I think there’s a resonance or gravitas with the fact 
that we do it, we’ve always done it and we always will do. It’s cultural you know
Cal We commit to it every week because other companies are then saying ‘oh we’d do that now and again but we couldn’t commit to doing 
it on a regular basis’
Ali And a lot of companies have done it for the tax reasons and all of that sort of thing for their own reasons rather than the actual giving. I 
don’t think that’s behind our thinking of it
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Conclusion
Against a background of ideological contest and contradic-
tory empirical claims (Raub 2017), the research reported 
here makes three contributions. First, it introduces a robust 
and theoretically grounded method for evidencing moral 
agency of employees within a hitherto disputed organisa-
tional context. Specifically, drawing on the multi-dimen-
sional conceptualisation of moral agency that inheres in 
virtue-informed accounts, our use of MacIntyre’s (1999a) 
schema demonstrates how empirical studies may generate 
and analyse narrative material. The findings help to illustrate 
understandings of morally agentic arguments advanced by 
the partners against four dimensions.
First, we have provided evidence to demonstrate that the 
intellectual dimension of moral agency (Alzola 2015) may 
be indicated by the application of counterfactual conditions 
(MacIntyre 1999a), by organisational agents. We have fur-
ther shown that the motivational dimension/intent condition 
(Alzola 2015; MacIntyre 1999a) can be evidenced by both 
expression of, and debate about, purpose and thirdly, that the 
emotional dimension (Alzola 2015) may be elicited when 
impact on beneficiaries is experienced by agents. In addi-
tion, the behavioural dimension (Alzola 2015) is examined 
through the range (contextual and temporal) of illustrations 
that agents provide.
Second, this paper provides empirical evidence that 
develops our understanding of the relationship between 
organisational features and the potential for moral agency 
situated within an organisational context. The John Lewis 
Partnership is a commercial organisation but provides a 
special case (Siggelkow 2007) that combines employee 
ownership, the continuing cultural influence of its philan-
thropic founder and a constitutional settlement that involves 
employees in decision-making. These features cohere with 
those who argue that employee involvement may enable 
moral agency within large-scale commercial organisations 
(e.g. Bernacchio and Couch 2015; Sinnicks 2014; Moore 
2017; Vriens et al. 2018). Our evidence provides support 
for their arguments as to the positive relationship between 
moral agency and employee involvement. Future research 
may explore moral agency in the context of private, state or 
employee-owned contexts with different types of decision-
making structure to further aid our understanding of the 
relationship between organisational ownership, structure 
and moral agency.
Our third contribution is to refute MacIntyre’s pessimism 
about the prospects for moral agency in commercial organi-
sations (MacIntyre 2000, 2007, 2015). Moral agency is only 
activated in particular and concrete circumstances. The 
appeals made by contemporary partners at the John Lewis 
Partnership to the philanthropic ambitions of its founder 
exemplifies moral agency. They drew inspiration from 
shared inheritance; and on this occasion found in a com-
mercial organisation, albeit one with exceptional features.
This paper has evidenced moral agency, provided examples 
that are at one and the same time intellectual, motivational, 
emotional and behavioural, and corroborated arguments as 
Table 3  Expressions of pathos
Lily Yeah and when you seen how happy that made them, you know someone that was like their little Christmas gift and it was just a 
lovely feeling in fact it’s making me tearful again
Sue And this lady who I thought was hard as nails she was crying as well. So you know sometimes you do pigeonhole people now and 
then you meet somebody like that and you become in that short time you become attached to them to that person erm and it was that 
was just a brilliant feeling and it benefitted them and it gave them confidence because they’d never worked for a long time
Margaret Yeah because you feel proud if you’ve even made someone smile do you know what I mean?…Last year or the year before we helped 
out with soldiers returning [from conflict] that were injured and I remember giving an item of bed linen that would have just been 
thrown out and it was just a memory foam topper and it was a soldier who was returning home who was an amputee and we thought 
‘well rather than throwing this out, it may just give them that extra comfort’. And we got the most amazing letter from his Mum and 
honestly it was– tears were in your eyes
Table 4  Expressions of range and consistency condition
Vikram I mean the catering department have been very involved with the [name of charity] haven’t they? The chefs have been out to show them 
how to cook meals at low prices and all of that kind of stuff so maybe that was part of that decision that we could do that kind of 
thing for them
Jakob And I think it’s good that we have a choice of what we can do. It’s not just giving money giving partners’ time you know it’s products 
as well giving- finding the best fit for what they want so that we can do different things and not just handing over a cheque every so 
often to someone you know
Maxine And [I am] also thinking you know ‘gosh my– the business I work for and am part of and a co-owner lets me go out and do this.’ You 
know I’ve just quickly seen one of my partners that does the reading programme and she just loves that so much she’s started doing 
that in her local school voluntarily so you know it’s lovely
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to the structural features that foster it. A half century ago, 
Flanders et al. (1968, p. 132) reported that senior partners at 
John Lewis “have committed themselves to a moral rather 
than a calculative relationship”; an extension of this argument 
to partners more widely is consistent with our findings.
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Appendix 1: Focus Group Questions
Opening questions/familiarity
 1 Are you aware that John Lewis gives to the commu-
nity?—Yes/How
 2 Do you know how this operates?
 3 What do you know about the giving activities John 
Lewis is involved with—what are they how does it 
work? Are there any other forms?
 4 How does John Lewis communicate the giving to you as 
a partner?
Decision-making and the notion of philanthropic 
gain
 5 What are the benefits to John Lewis in terms of the 
giving?
 6 Do you know which charities approach you and what the 
competing charities/community are?
 7 How does John Lewis make the decisions on which 
charity/community groups get support when there are 
so many competing for help?
 8 In terms of making the decisions who is involved?—
How does this happen?
 9 What process would John Lewis expect to follow before 
a decision is made?
 10 As a partner, what do you consider to be priorities when 
making community giving decisions?
 11 Should customers be involved in community decision-
making?—Why? How?
 12 Would you want to get involved with the community 
giving programme?—are there any barriers to doing 
this?
 13 What are the various ways the community/John Lewis 
can benefit from the giving—can you give examples? 
Should there be promoted benefits to John Lewis?
Personal attitudes and feelings
 14 What is your attitude toward John Lewis giving time, 
money products and services?—Why?
 15 As a partner, how does it make you feel to be part of a 
company that engages in giving?
 16 Is there any pressure to be involved in philanthropy?—
What would be your reasons for involved/not 
involved?—(business/personal)
 17 What does John Lewis know about your views as a part-
ner in relation to the giving and the giving decisions—
is there a two way communication process?
 18 What if anything would you change to enhance the giv-
ing programme?
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